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Texas, whose people do not take this kind of thing lightly, would be the forty-eighth largest country in the world. 2 Taken together, more to the point, the fifty constitutions cover all of the land mass and population covered by the United States Constitution, save for a few territories and a conspicuous district, providing a second set of constitutional powers and constraints that touch nearly every American.
Scale, then, must be a partial answer, not a complete one. Else, the greatest constitution of all might be the Charter of the United Nations. Scale alone does not explain why most Americans do not know they live in a state with its own constitution. 3 It does not explain why so few law schools teach state constitutional law. 4 Why still fewer of the top-ranked law schools teach the subject. 5 Why so few states place the topic on their bar exams. 6 And it does not explain why many newly minted lawyers, licensed to practice law by individual states, not the United States, do not know what it means when they swear to uphold the Federal Constitution and their state constitution. 7 At least four other features of state constitutional law, it seems to me, diminish it in the eyes of the legal profession: the undue length of most state constitutions; the ease with which they may be amended; the election of judges who interpret them; and lockstep interpretations of the state constitutions with the Federal Constitution. The point of this essay is to examine each critique-dignifying some, responding to others-and to place them all in the broader context of American constitutionalism.
II. THE CONTENT AND LENGTH OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
As a matter of appearance, state constitutions do not look the part. Too many of them are cluttered with provisions having little to do with the architecture of government and more to do with the kinds of everyday concerns covered by legislation. First impressions make a difference, and a first glance at most state charters suggests a state code, not a state constitution. All state constitutions contain the essentials of structure and rights, and a few of them admirably restrict themselves to the basics-take the constitutions of Missouri, New Hampshire, and Virginia.
8 But these few exceptions highlight the norm that most state constitutions diminish the essentials of governing by associating them with page after page of laws that amount to nothing more than legislation dressed up in constitutional garb. And often exotic legislation at that. Consider these state constitutional provisions: obligating the government to promote the sale of catfish; 9 phasing out the use of gill nets in fishing;
10 authorizing the operation of four casinos and regulating how they must be run, including the parcels of property where they must be located;
11 mandating "the protection of livestock against the introduction or spread of pleuro pneumonia, glanders, splenetic or Texas fever"; 12 addressing the "manner of filling vacancies on the Morgan County Board of Education"; 13 allowing the legislature to regulate the inspection of cattle; 14 and providing grounds for divorce.
15
Not just the appearance that state constitutions regulate a remarkable array of subjects, but its prosaic reality, lessens state constitutions. At the founding, the average state constitution contained roughly 7000 words. 16 Yet today, state constitutions average 36,000 words in length, four times the length of the Federal Constitution. 17 The Alabama Constitution has 287 sections and 827 amendments, 18 and the California Constitution has more than 200 sections. 19 As of 2010, the states have held 233 constitutional conventions and generated more than 7000 constitutional amendments. In contrast to the sparing elegance of the United States Constitution, which has generated just twenty-seven amendments and which lacks "the prolixity of a legal code," 21 state constitutions look like yard sales, filled with items that never should have been included in the first place and that obscure the basics of governing. There seems to be a tendency to constitutionalize anything that matters a lot to this or that group, "to enshrine every value" they "hold dear,"
22 to demonstrate its value by establishing that it is protected not just by law but by supreme law. Yet governmental charters that constitutionalize everything run the risk of constitutionalizing nothing, of inflating away the value of establishing fundamental laws in the first place.
More than just aesthetics, then, is at risk. The undiscriminating range of topics in most state constitutions runs the risk not just of disfiguring them but of undermining the dignity of the charters, of leading the legal academy, to say nothing of the public, not to "tak[e] state constitutions seriously." 23 No one to my knowledge defends this feature of the states' constitutions. But there is an explanation.
III. THE EASE OF AMENDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Most state constitutions look the way they do because their contents depend on the restraint of just fifty-one percent of a state's voters. In contrast to the United States Constitution, which requires three-quarters of the states to ratify any proposed change to it, a mere majority of the electorate may amend the constitutions of forty-seven states. 24 While Article V stands sentinel against efforts to change the United States Constitution, the majoritarian nature of the states' amendment procedures invites rather than discourages alteration, even in the context of guarantees designed to protect the individual from a democratic majority.
What good is a liberty guarantee or a measure designed to protect discrete groups of citizens if both are one statewide initiative away from thought that an amendment procedure that has generated just fifteen amendments since his generation left us has answered the risk of deadhand control.
33
Both the state and federal constitutions, it is well to consider, may imperfectly balance the competing interests between reform and stability, "between timelessness and timeliness."
34 If the state constitutions are too easy to amend, perhaps the Federal Constitution is too hard to amend.
35
While there is much to admire about the steadfastness of a regime in which nearly 10,000 proposed amendments have been presented to Congress since 1789 and all but twenty-seven of them resisted, 36 not everyone says a nearly unalterable charter is a virtue. Some worry that provisions have "become[] irrelevant when needed change and rectification of mistakes becomes all but impossible" due to the supermajority requirements for ratification.
37 Some worry about the pressure placed on the United States Supreme Court to reset the document, to make it relevant to modern disputes through interpretation, 38 which "risks . . . putting a singular power, a Framer's pen, in the hands of five sitting Justices."
39 Some critics, indeed, charge that "[t]he difficulty of amending that Constitution has led to a regime dominated by non-Article V constitutional change." 40 Others worry that many anti-democratic, but clearly worded, features of the United States Constitution make little end of that period then, a new majority is come into place, or, in other words, a new generation. Each generation is as independent as the one preceding, as that was of all which had gone before. It has then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness; . . . and it is for the peace and good of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this every nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the constitution. HOLLAND ET To the extent the state and federal amendment procedures imperfectly balance the competing interests in stability and progress, they each err in the right direction. Far better, it would seem, to have a nearly immutable national charter and variable state charters than to have the reverse.
Even granting the full force of the majoritarian critique, the state amendment procedures are not monolithic.
Consistent with the complexity of the task at hand, the states use a variety of mechanisms, some easier than others, yet all of them undermining the notion that there is just one path to constitutional reform. 43 The most commonly invoked model of revision is the legislative initiative. 44 Of all state amendments between 1964 and 1993, legislative initiatives prompted ninety percent of them. 45 These initiatives typically require approval by the state legislature followed by popular ratification.
46
States generally use legislative initiatives for limited changes, and some states prohibit their use for more extensive amendment. Hampshire-not unlike the national government, impose supermajority requirements on the commencement of legislative initiatives. 48 Delaware requires two-thirds approval by the legislature in two succeeding sessions.
49
New Hampshire requires two-thirds approval of the legislature, while Florida requires three-fifths approval of it, after which each measure goes to the people for a majority vote. 50 Delaware stands alone in allowing amendments by legislative initiative that do not require popular ratification.
51
Of the state amendment procedures, the legislative initiative is not only the most frequently used, but it is also "the least controversial" because it customarily requires legislative and popular approval, ensuring that reforms made this way are "likely to have the support of significant political forces in the state."
52 At least when it comes to this procedure, no one can say that it takes the same effort to amend the constitution as it does to change a statute-that state constitutional law and state legislation are one.
Constitutional conventions, generally used to achieve system-wide reform, account for the second highest number of amendments.
53 While the national government has not held a constitutional convention since 1787, the states have held more than 230 as of 2009. 54 In all states, a majority or supermajority vote determines whether the work of a constitutional convention will become law.
55
Fourteen states even require that the electorate periodically be given a chance to vote-again by a majority 56 -on whether to convene a new constitutional convention. Others collect information and prepare recommendations in advance of constitutional conventions to assist the convention delegates.
62 Still others propose constitutional revisions to be submitted to the legislature or the voters.
63
Roughly two-thirds of the states used constitutional commissions in one way or another between 1971 and 2001. 64 Because any recommendations made by constitutional commissions require approval by the legislature or the voters, and usually both, this device does not amount to an independent form of constitutional revision but an added procedure designed to smooth the path to constitutional reform.
When critics speak of unduly frequent constitutional revisions or, less charitably, of "amendomania,"
65 they usually mean the last method of reform: the popular initiative. First adopted by South Dakota in 1898, 66 and initially conceived of as a progressive reform, the initiative is used by just over a third of the states to approve constitutional amendments.
67 But "nowhere is the practice of government by voter initiative as extreme as it is in California." 68 After serving for many years on the California Supreme Court, and after observing how the initiative has contributed "to the ease with which California's Constitution can be-and regularly is-amended," Chief Justice George Rather than take sides on this debate, let me instead accept the charges as true-for argument's sake-and try to place them in context. A minority of states use this procedure, and thus only a minority of states run the risk of suffering from it. To the extent this type of reform contains structural deficiencies, as Chief Justice George warns, there is no reason to think that it is beyond the people of the affected states to listen to, appreciate, and eventually even respond to the pitfalls. In this sense, a fifty-one percent tipping point for amending a state constitution is as much an ally as an obstacle to reform, particularly structural reform. And if, for one reason or another, a majority of a state's citizens do not want to change such a pivotal method of reform, it is fair to ask whether they deserve-or at least have decided to embrace-the alleged "chaos" that results.
71 So far, as it turns out, roughly sixty percent of Californians still respect decisions made by voters through the initiative process more than decisions made by the governor and legislature.
72
Not just Californians have a chance to experiment with and, if need be, alter the initiative process, but so do the residents of other states. Justice Paul Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court recently called for reforms of the Ohio Constitution, which also permits constitutional initiatives. 73 He complained that the Ohio Constitution was too long, encumbered by too many non-fundamental provisions, warning that 69. George 74 When it comes to the rules for constitutional reform, as opposed to the weather, Ohioans remain free to pick the model they want, a timerespected virtue of federalism.
Many of the eighteen states that permit constitutional initiatives also place limitations on them. 75 Some place certain topics off limits: Mississippi excludes its Bill of Rights from the procedure; Illinois allows only initiatives related to "the legislative article"; and Massachusetts precludes the initiative from affecting its Declaration of Rights, the judiciary, or issues concerning religion. 76 The states also limit the procedure by requiring not-insignificant numbers of signatures before an initiative goes on the ballot: Arizona requires fifteen percent of all votes cast in the last election for governor, while Oklahoma requires fifteen percent of votes cast in the race receiving the highest number of votes.
77
California requires eight percent of all votes cast for governor in the last gubernatorial election.
78
Half of the affected states ensure that the initiative relates to a statewide concern, not a local one. Typical of this last restriction is Florida, which demands signatures from eight percent of the votes cast in the last presidential election in at least half of the congressional districts. 79 Still other restrictions exist. In Nevada, an initiative must receive majority support in back-to-back general elections. 80 Is it always the case, moreover, that legal guarantees, even individual rights guarantees, should be discounted because they are democratic? Is there a risk, as one scholar wonders, of becoming too obsessed with countermajoritarianism, of losing sight of the possibility that supermajority requirements are not invariably a precondition of progress and occasionally may be an impediment to it?
86 Some of the landmarks in federal constitutional law no doubt represented the epitome of countermajoritarian law at the time they were issued. Brown v. Board of Education comes to mind. As does West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette . 87 Yet one of the most significant civil rights breakthroughs in American history came not from the interpretation of a countermajoritarian guarantee but from the adoption of a majoritarian one: the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 88 All things being equal, would one rather live in a country (or a state) in which a citizen consensus protects the rights of minority groups or in which a court consensus does so? That state constitutional provisions are more responsive to the will of the people at a given point in time than the Federal Constitution is not invariably a curse. 
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All of this underscores the perils of generalization, whether about the ease with which state constitutions can be amended, the impact of the amendment procedures on state government, or the impact of these procedures on individual rights. The variations prove not that state constitutions as a group are too populist but instead that choosing rules for altering charters of government is complex, leading to a variety of paths for preserving lasting but relevant charters, nearly all of which add meaningful obstacles to the amendment process-obstacles that do not encumber the passage of ordinary law.
IV. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
State constitutions face a related critique, that the judges tasked with interpreting them are elected. This feature of most state judiciaries, the argument goes, adds a second fault line in any effort to protect individuals from their government: elected judges may lack the will to defy the majority in a given case, and even when they muster the courage, the majority may change the constitution in response.
One need not look far to find critics of judicial elections. The alleged faults are many: The fundraising demands of running for office create appearance problems; 90 the courts were designed to be the nonpolitical branch of government, making it odd to select judges through the ballot box; 91 the electorate lacks sufficient information to choose judges effectively; 92 and popularly elected judges are unwilling to protect unpopular groups, particularly those charged with crime. 93 If Justice O'Connor, who was herself a state court judge and who spent twenty-six years reviewing the work of the state supreme courts, thinks contested judicial elections are unsound, perhaps that is reason enough to listen. Others wonder what is wrong with allowing the people of a state to respond to judicial decisions they do not like. 96 They argue that judicial elections are democratic, establish accountability, and limit overreaching by the judiciary, adding that a system of political appointments does not necessarily produce better-or more impartial-judges. 97 And as election defenders frequently point out, many people like having the choice.
98
No matter how strongly one criticizes or defends judicial elections, the impact of them on state constitutional law should not be overstated. It is true that eighty-seven percent of the state judges throughout the country must face the electorate at regular intervals.
99 But just as the states' methods of constitutional reform vary, so do their methods of judicial selection. 
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ranging from six to fourteen years, 106 four do not. Massachusetts and New Hampshire allow judges, once appointed, to serve until age seventy. 107 In New Jersey, once judges have been reappointed after an initial seven-year term, they may serve until seventy. 108 After appointment, judges in Rhode Island enjoy life tenure.
109
Judges in eighteen states face retention elections but are not initially selected through elections. Whether appointed by the state's governor, a nominating commission, or some other body, judges in these states face what amounts to popular reappointment votes, as they are the only individuals on the ballot. 110 A high percentage of judges win these elections, 111 and these contests usually do not impose heavy, if any, fundraising demands on judges.
112 Recently, there have been notable exceptions to the contrary, and perhaps they suggest a trend. 113 Yet, historically, there has been considerable support for this approach to balancing judicial independence and accountability. 114 Two states, Illinois and Pennsylvania, combine retention elections with more traditional elections in selecting their judges. They fill vacancies through contested elections, then require the judges to win periodic retention elections to stay on the court. 115 
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The remaining nineteen states select judges through contested elections in which two or more opponents may appear on the ballot.
116
Of these, fifteen are handled through nonpartisan election, 117 meaning that a judge's party affiliation does not appear on the ballot, while four select judges through partisan elections.
118
All told, roughly three-fifths of the states (twenty-nine) do not use traditional elections to choose their judges. And of the twenty-one states that use elections in which two or more candidates may be on the ballot, only four of them involve partisan elections. Roughly eighty-five percent of incumbent state supreme court justices in open elections, whether partisan or nonpartisan, win reelection. 119 More than ninetyeight percent of justices win retention elections. 120 An overview of the states' approaches to judicial selection thus reveals a range of approaches-including some that roughly parallel the federal selection model-and confirms that only a discrete minority use party-based election models.
Instead of undermining state constitutional law, this diversity of judicial-selection methods confirms the difficulty of the task at hand: how to use a majoritarian process to pick candidates for a nonmajoritarian job. There is no such thing as a nondemocratic approach to picking American judges. Even the United States Constitution requires a popularly elected President to make the nominations and a popularly elected Senate to confirm them. 
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together with a prohibition on reducing pay, may help to insulate federal judges from politics, but the judges still must be selected at the outset by office holders who obtained a majority, not a minority, of votes. Even if we characterize the models adopted by the federal government and twelve of the states as the most insulated from electoral politics, it is difficult to deny that those involved in the selection and confirmation process have become increasingly accountable to the electorate for their choices. A central critique of state judicial elections is the risk of "backlash" and the impact this may have on judicial decisions.
122 Whatever the nature of that threat, is it not possible that federal judicial decisions over the last five decades have affected later nominations and confirmations? Many say they have.
123
Critics of judicial elections, particularly those who think they make ordinary law out of constitutional law, also must account for state court decisions over the last several decades, in which elected judges granted individual-rights protections that life-tenured federal justices would not. A narrative assuming that only politically insulated judges will protect politically disfavored rights must account for a range of contrary state court decisions. What if we switch from landmark federal constitutional decisions that deny relief to decisions that grant relief? Did the National Supreme Court march alone or were the state and federal courts traveling similar paths or at least borrowing from each other in the process?
Brown v. Board of Education, 136 perhaps the most prominent example of federal judicial relief in the face of recalcitrant states, paints a complicated picture. The companion case to Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe, 137 involved the segregated schools of the District of Columbia, a federal enclave that no state court or legislature could reach. And the "separate but equal" defense raised in both Brown and Bolling was one of the U.S. Supreme Court's own making. 138 Before Brown, seventeen states, like the District of Columbia, segregated their schools, sixteen prohibited segregation in schools, four allowed local districts to decide the matter, and eleven had no laws on the subject.
139

Mapp v. Ohio
140 and the development of the exclusionary rule involved a state-federal judicial partnership that continues to this day. Several state courts innovated the rule around the turn of the twentieth century. acknowledged in opting not to follow its earlier non-incorporation decision. 145 On this historical slate, it is no overstatement to conclude that the Court "relied on the states not just as independent expositors of constitutional values, but as laboratories whose practical experience with constitutional rules was enlightening."
146 Nor is the "dialogue" over. Since the Court developed an exception to the exclusionary rule for officers who rely in good faith on the existence of a warrant in United States v. Leon, 147 twenty state courts have declined to apply the Leon good-faith exception under their own constitutions.
148
District of Columbia v. Heller 149 followed a course that most of the state courts had charted. Before interpreting the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to bear arms-as opposed to a collective right-most of the state courts had already ruled the same way under their own constitutions. Forty-four state constitutions protect the right to keep and bear arms, and thirty-nine of the courts in those states had interpreted these provisions to protect an individual right to keep arms before Heller. 150 The lone exception is Massachusetts, which has held that its provision protected a collective right rather than an individual right.
151 Kansas, whose court had formerly held that the right to bear arms was a collective one, 152 amended its constitution last year to make it clear that the right is individual.
153
Hawaii and Virginia have not addressed the issue.
154
The point of this discussion is not to laud or lament these decisions. It is to reveal the risk of generalizing about the impact of judicial elections on state constitutional law and still more so on the future of state constitutional law. As with the impact of majoritarian amendment procedures, the election story is a complex and nuanced one. Here too we have a conundrum-finding a democratic way to pick people for a 145 157 There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed the same. Still less is there reason to think that a highly generalized guarantee, such as a prohibition on "unreasonable" searches, would have just one meaning for a range of differently situated sovereigns. Yet in my experience, state and federal courts frequently handle such cases by considering the federal constitutional claim first, after which they summarily announce that the state provision means the same thing. Why the meaning of a federal guarantee proves the meaning of an independent state guarantee is rarely explained and often seems inexplicable. If the court decisions of another sovereign ought to bear on the inquiry, those of a sister state should have more to say about the point. State constitutions are more likely to share historical and cultural similarities. They necessarily will cover smaller jurisdictions. And in almost all instances they will be construing individual-liberty guarantees that originated in state constitutions, not the Federal Constitution, 159 and they indeed will be exercising a power-judicial review-that originated in state constitutional law, not in Marbury v. Madison. 160 Why borrow in particular from the larger, far larger, jurisdiction? Federalism considerations may lead the United States Supreme Court to underenforce (or at least not to overenforce) constitutional guarantees in view of the number of people affected (over 300 million) and the range of jurisdictions implicated (one national government, fifty states, and thousands of local governments). 161 No state supreme court, by contrast, has any reason to apply a "federalism discount" to its decisions, 162 making it odd for state courts to rely exclusively on the meaning of the Federal Constitution in construing their own.
State court decisions of this type not only seem to be prioritizing the wrong decisions in determining the meaning of their own constitutions, but they also seem to be inverting the right sequence for considering state and federal arguments. Federal constitutional avoidance principles would suggest that the state guarantee ought to be considered first. If the state supreme court grants relief to the claimant on the state ground and provides a clear statement that it is doing so, 163 the case is over, and the need to construe the federal constitutional provision disappears with it. 164 No version of the constitutional avoidance doctrine to my knowledge says that courts should consider the claim arising from the larger sovereign before they consider the claim arising from the smaller one.
The nature of a federal constitutional claim points in the same direction. At issue is whether state action violates the Federal Constitution. If the state constitution prohibits the law or conduct at issue, however, there is no work for the Federal Constitution to do. 165 Why not consider that point first, not as a matter of exhaustion, but as a matter of potentially eliminating any ultra vires state action at all and sparing the need to consider the federal claim in the process? By deciding the federal claim first, state courts engage in federal constitutional aggrandizement, not avoidance, and they risk diminishing their state constitutions in the process. By doing the reverse, they claim the rightful independence of their state constitutions.
In defense of the state (and federal) courts that take this path, explanations abound. As a matter of history, state constitutional law may have been all that mattered in the country's first 150 years, at least from the perspective of an individual-rights claimant. 166 But the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights beginning in the 1920s started to change that, and the expansion of federal constitutional protections in the 1950s and 1960s completed the transformation. After the breakthroughs of the Warren Court revolution, who could blame state courts and advocates for relegating state constitutional claims to second-class treatment, if indeed to any treatment at all? A tradition of jurisprudence premised on the predominance of federal rights may not be easy to undo. Even though twenty-first century state courts are as apt to be constitutional innovators as federal courts, 167 decades of state court precedents remain on the books paralleling the federal precedents or at least starting their analyses with them. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
Efficiencies also may make a difference. Keep in mind that, by one count, ninety-five percent of the disputes resolved by courts in this country are filed in the state courts, as opposed to the federal ones. 168 Just one of those courts, the California Supreme Court, resolved thirtyseven state constitutional law disputes in 2005, while the United States Supreme Court resolved thirty federal constitutional law disputes that same year. 169 All of this makes it understandable that state courts would keep up with their burgeoning dockets by sticking to the calf-path rather than diverging from it. 170 Also daunting is the reality, at least the one I have experienced, that many advocates do not press the state arguments on an independent basis. What is argued is not a ground-up assessment of the independent meaning of the state guarantee, premised on its language, its history, or early understandings of its meaning. The point urged instead is that the state courts should construe the state guarantee differently because they can, not because they must, or because the dissent rather than the majority in a U.S. Supreme Court case has the better of the (federal) arguments. This is the one respect in which Justice Brennan's boundary-crossing 1977 article 171 delivered less than it could have for the development of state constitutional law. With the waning of civil rights victories brought by the end of the Warren Court and the beginning of the Burger Court, Justice Brennan pressed the state courts to fortify the breach, to grant relief by another name: a state constitution.
172 "It may not be wide of the mark," he said, "to suppose that . . . state courts discern, and disagree with, a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court to pull back from, or at least suspend for the time being, the . . . application of the federal Bill of Rights and the restraints of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment."
173 State courts, he thus urged, "cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution," but should grant relief under their own constitutions instead.
In one respect, Justice Brennan was right. Constitutional claimants should prefer two arrows in their quiver-two chances, not just one, to invalidate a state or local law. But the messenger and the message may have helped to perpetuate, if not to create, two damaging myths.
The messenger may have prompted state court advocates and judges to misperceive this option as designed only to be a liberal ratchet, to give just some rights but not others a second chance in the state courts. Yet as shown above, independent state courts (and legislatures) often have protected a range of rights, whether involving liberty, equality, or property, whether before or after the federal courts entered the picture. That the state constitutions provide a second avenue for invalidating a local law says nothing about what kind of law should be, or will be, challenged. 175 The message pushed one feature of state constitutional law (the authority of the states to construe their constitutions differently) at the expense of another (an independent basis for doing so). The suggested inquiry was not whether state constitutional law demanded a different answer from federal constitutional law based on language, context, and history; it was that, if there is a will, there is now a new way for granting relief. 176 Instead of urging first-principle inquiries into the meaning of the state provisions, the article urged state courts to side with the dissenters in debates already held at the United States Supreme Courtunder federal law no less. 177 While state court judges and advocates assuredly have the authority to invoke dissents rather than majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court in construing their own constitutions, heavy reliance on debates about the meaning of a federal guarantee are not apt to dignify the state constitutions as independent sources of law. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
The Brennan article thus helped advance state constitutional law in one sense: by reminding advocates, through a prominent Supreme Court Justice, that once-forgotten state constitutional protections remain on the books and that they provide an alternative theory for relief. But in a state constitutional law equivalent of Stockholm syndrome, the article may have advanced the unfortunate myth that federal constitutional law remains front and center-the first line of inquiry-leaving state constitutional law as the quintessential argument of last resort.
Some say that federal claims should be resolved first in cases presenting federal and state contentions because state courts cannot construe their constitutions to offer less protection than the federal guarantee. 178 That is wrong. State courts remain free to construe their constitutional guarantees to offer as little protection as they think appropriate, and only a constitutional amendment can alter that decision. Some state courts have said as much. 179 The only thing state courts cannot do is ignore the independent federal claim. It may be true that a state constitutional ruling that asks less of the government than existing federal constitutional law requires will not impact the parties before the court. But that is not a moot point. Once a state court establishes the interrelation between the two guarantees, it has established that no state constitutional inquiry is needed, a not-unhelpful development for future litigants and courts.
That also is a not-insignificant development for the United States Supreme Court, as it manages and assesses decisions of its own. Some state court rulings directly implicate the meaning of a federal guarantee, such as the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment." 180 And some state court rulings may help to inform the original meaning of language in the Federal Constitution that first appeared in the state constitutions or may provide pragmatic reasons for following or steering clear of an approach embraced by the states. 181 Why live in a "top-down constitutional world" when we have the option of allowing the states to be the "vanguard-the first ones to decide whether to embrace or reject innovative legal claims"-and allowing the United States Supreme Court, informed by these experiences, to decide whether to federalize the issue. 182 In a process that Professor Blocher calls "reverse incorporation," the United States Supreme Court remains free, whether on pragmatic or originalist grounds, to learn from and, if appropriate, borrow from the states' experiences. 183 Perhaps some fear confusion in the bar if the state courts de-link the two constitutional inquiries. After all, the United States Supreme Court's multi-decade experiment with dueling standards for Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the state and federal governments did not end well, as the Court ultimately collapsed the two. 184 But is confusion really a problem for a single state? If the state courts treat the two guarantees as distinct, the bench, bar, law enforcement, and citizenry still will have to pay attention to just one standard: the more far-reaching of the two.
In the final analysis, there assuredly are historical and practical explanations for linking the meaning of federal and state guarantees and for prioritizing consideration of the federal ones. But continuing to do so in 2011 as a matter of course is increasingly difficult to justify and, worse, all the more likely to deepen the inertia-driven groove that already exists. 185 
VI. CONCLUSION
To the credit of the Kansas Law Review, this symposium brings muchneeded attention to a chronically underappreciated subject: the role of the constitutions of the fifty states in American constitutionalism. An emphasis on federal constitutional law in the law schools, the academic literature, and the private bar may be an understandable, perhaps even desirable, feature of 182. Sutton, supra note 3, at 176 twenty-first century American law. But the all-too-frequent neglect of state constitutional law in these settings is not, unless one believes that lawyers should specialize in being half-equipped to handle constitutional matters on behalf of their clients. In considering why state constitutional law is taken less seriously than it should be, this Essay attempts to burst some bubbles and deflate a few others. Yes, the amendment procedures and judicial elections that prevail in most states present marked contrasts with their federal counterparts. Yes, the distinction helps to explain, even sustain, the critique that the state courts frequently err on the majoritarian side of the countermajoritarian dilemma. And yes, the prolixity of the state constitutions and the frequent linkage of them to the meaning of their federal counterpart diminishes the gravity of state constitutionalism. Yet the complexity of these issues and the remarkable diversity of state approaches to them underscore the perils of dismissing state constitutional law on these grounds. After more than 200 years of experience, it is difficult to say that a consensus has emerged on the most challenging of these topics-how to select judges and how to amend constitutions-for each of this country's sovereigns, suggesting that the nation may be better off embracing fifty-one imperfect, ever-changing answers to these questions rather than just one. Through it all, American constitutionalism surely will profit from a healthy dialogue between the two systems, one spurred on by this welcome symposium.
